#### Vulnerability Assessment in Smart Grids

Jinyuan Stella Sun UTK Fall 2016

## Contents

- Background
- Roadmap
- Vulnerability Assessment of Phasor Networks
- Defense and countermeasures

- The advent of Smart Grid
  - A class of technologies used to modernize electricity delivery systems, using computerbased remote control and automations
  - Two-way communication and computer processing that has been used for decades in other industries

- The advent of Smart Grid
  - Benefits by incorporating richer data
    - Better interoperability
    - Big improvements in efficiency
      - Electricity delivery system
      - Energy users
    - A more resilient power grid

- Data security is critical
  - Security: control, operation, applications in the smart grid rely on accurate and timely data

- Data security under threat
  - External: hackers, state sponsored cyberwarfare targeting the critical infrastructure.
  - Internal: Disgruntled employee, industrial espionage

#### News on attacks on decoy SCADA system

#### We Set Up a Decoy. Hackers Came. From Beijing. And Chattanooga

By Jordan Robertson | Sep 30, 2014 8:29 PM ET | 6 Comments 🛎 Email 🛱 Print

Three months after online decoys were set up pretending to be industrial-control systems, **we wrote** about how computers from the U.S., China and Russia were found to be the biggest sources for launching scouting attacks against these fake critical infrastructures.

This week, **ThreatStream**, a cybersecurity company that set up the target computers at Bloomberg's request, went deeper with the data. Hidden in the larger dataset, which catalogued thousands of reconnaissance probes against our honeypots, was a subset of attacks that



Photographer: Sipa via AP Photo

#### Bloomberg News 9/30/2014



#### Attack on U.S. Electrical Grid Could Cost \$1 Trillion




-zhangyang13576997233/Shutterstock.com

The economic damage to the world economy from a cyberattack on the U.S. power grid would total between \$243 billion to more than \$1 trillion, depending on the nature and severity of the attack, according to a report released Wednesday.




- Challenges
  - New technologies
  - Larger volume, wider variety
  - More entities involved
    - Multiple data creators (ownership)
    - Multiple data consumers
    - Private data cross multiple trust boundaries

#### Data-centric perspective



## Roadmap

Research topics



Vulnerability Assessment of Phasor Network

#### **Phasor Network Applications**

#### Introduction

- Phasor network enables many useful phasor data applications
- Phasor data applications rely on accurate and timely phasor data collected and transferred by the phasor network
- Vulnerabilities may exist in the standards, protocols, implementations, and configurations of the phasor network technologies.

### What is Vulnerability Assessment?

#### Vulnerability assessment

• The process of identifying, quantifying, and prioritizing the vulnerabilities of a system, network, or application.


## Vulnerability Assessment in Literature

#### State-of-the-art

- Zhu, Bonnie, Anthony Joseph, and Shankar Sastry. "A taxonomy of cyber attacks on SCADA systems." *Internet of Things (iThings/CPSCom), 2011 International Conference on and 4th International Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing*. IEEE, 2011.
- Stewart, John, et al. "Synchrophasor Security Practices." (2010).
- Sridhar, Siddharth, Adam Hahn, and Manimaran Govindarasu. "Cyber–physical system security for the electric power grid." *Proceedings of the IEEE* 100.1 (2012): 210-224.

#### A Typical Phasor Network

- Preliminary
  - Phasor network




#### IEEE C37.118 Standard

- Preliminary
  - IEEE C37.118 standard
    - Synchronization to the UTC time
    - Time accuracy
    - Definitions of synchrophasors
    - Criterion for the evaluation of quality of synchrophasor measurements
    - Messaging system
      - Four types of frames
      - A data transfer protocol

C37.118 Data Format


- Preliminary
  - IEEE C37.118 standard
    - Frames
      - Header frame
      - Configuration frame
      - Command frame
      - Data frame





C37.118 Protocol


- Preliminary
  - IEEE C37.118 standard
    - Protocol





#### Prototype Phasor Network

- Preliminary
  - Small prototype of phasor network



#### **Penetration Testing Procedure**

- What is penetration testing?
  - Using the discovered vulnerabilities to exploit a system, network, or application
- We followed the procedure of penetration testing
  - Formally, it is defined in PTES (penetration testing execution standard)
    - Pre-engagement interactions
    - Intelligence gathering
    - Threat modeling
    - Vulnerability analysis
    - Exploitation
    - Post-exploitation
    - Reporting

Key Steps

- We focus on the key steps
  - Reconnaissance
  - Exploitation
  - Exploit development

-exploit: an exploit is the means by which an attacker, or pentester, takes advantage of a flaw within a system, an application, or a service. An attacker uses an exploit to attack a system in a way that results in a particular desired outcome that the developer never intended.

#### Reconnaissance

- Reconnaissance
  - Collect information about the system under test
  - Host discovering, operating system fingerprinting, packet sniffing
  - Social engineering

#### Exploitation

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Validate the possible vulnerabilities
    - Automated
    - Manual



### Exploit Development

- Exploit development
  - Develop practical attacks that exploits the vulnerabilities
  - Serve as a proof to convince the asset owner their system is vulnerable
  - Provide mitigation recommendations

## Pentesting Techniques/Attacks Used

- Packet Sniffing
  - Shared media network: listening to network traffic using NIC under promiscuous mode
  - Switched network: MAC flooding or ARP poisoning to force the network traffic to be forwarded to the sniffer
  - Wireshark
- Packet Injection
  - Send packets to target network service.
  - Packets appear to be legitimate but will interfere with normal execution of the network services or applications.
  - Scapy
- Fuzz testing (Fuzzing)
  - Enumerate all possible inputs (emulate inputs that cross trust boundaries)
  - Test the devices with frames carrying the enumerated inputs
  - Identify inputs that cause the network service to behave abnormally or even crash
  - Scapy



### **Common Pentesting Tools**

- Metasploit
  - Consists of modules: auxiliaries, exploits, payloads
- Kali Linux
  - Contains more than 300 pentesting tools for various use cases (password cracking, wireless attack, ...)
- Nmap
  - Network mapper
  - Contains a set of tools: Nmap, Nping, Zenmap

#### Reconnaissance Result (1)

Reconnaissance Result – Host discovering

Scan Tools Profile He	elp		
Target: 192.168.0.0/2	4	Profile: Intense scan	* Scan Cancel
Command: nmap -T4	-A -v 192.168.0.0/24		
Hosts Services	Nmap Output Ports / Hosts	Topology Host Details Scans	
OS Host *	Hosts Viewer Fisheye		Save Graphic
192.168.0.5		M	H
9 192.168.0.9	PD	C 192.168.0.4 localhost PMU 192.168.0.9	
Filter Hosts	Fisheye on ring 1.00	with interest factor 1.81	and spread factor 0.50 +

#### Reconnaissance Result (2)

Reconnaissance Result – Packet sniffing

▶User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 36835 (36835), Dst Port: 41123 (41123) ▼IEEE C37.118 Synchrophasor Protocol, Configuration Frame 2 ▶ Synchronization word: 0xaa31 Framesize: 374 PMU/DC ID number: 1 SOC time stamp (UTC): 2015-04-09 18:33:18 ▶ Time quality flags Fraction of second (raw): 855 vConfiguration data, 1 PMU(s) included Resolution of fractional second time stamp: 16777215 Number of PMU blocks included in the frame: 1 ▼Station #1: "MK208 PMU/DC ID number: 1 ▶Data format in data frame Number of phasors: 3 Number of analog values: 0 Number of digital status words: 1 ▶ Phasor names (3) ▶Digital status labels (16) ▶ Phasor conversation factors (3) ▶ Masks for digital status words (1) .... 1 = Nominal line freqency: 50Hz Configuration change count: 0 Rate of transmission: 25 frame(s) per second

#### **Reconnaissance Result Summary**

- Summary of Reconnaissance Result
  - Packets are not encrypted or integrity protected
    - PMU/PDC ID
    - Configuration information of the data frame
    - Possible attacks: eavesdropping, packet modification
  - Lack of user or message authentication mechanisms
    - Possible attacks: packet injection, impersonation
  - Stateful Protocol
    - Possible attacks: Denial-of-Service (DoS)
  - PDC stores and processes external inputs using SQL
    - Possible attacks: SQL injection

#### Exploitation

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Criteria for choosing vulnerabilities
    - Easy to exploit
    - High impact on the data security


#### **Exploitation Details**

Vulnerability Exploitation

Cause of Vulnerabilities	Possible attacks	Testing technique	
Lack of encryption	eavesdropping, replay	Packet sniffing	
Lack of	impersonation	Packet sniffing	
user authentication	man-in-the-middle attack	Packet injection	
Lack of	former and differentian	Packet sniffing	
message authentication	frame modification	Packet injection	
Unamented from or	Denial-of-Service	Packet injection	
Unexpected frames	Denial-of-Service	Fuzzing	
Lack of input validation	SQL injection code injection	Packet injection	

#### Exploitation Result (1)


- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of encryption  $\rightarrow$  Eavesdropping



Captured C37.118 Command Frame: start data transmission

### Exploitation Result (2)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of encryption  $\rightarrow$  Eavesdropping



0000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08	00	45	00		E.	
0010	00	2e	ad	cd	40	00	40	11	8e	ef	7f	00	00	01	7f	00	@.@.		
														12	00	0c		A	
0030	55	30	13	7a	00	00	00	00	00	01	dc	fc					U0.z		

Captured C37.118 Command Frame: stop data transmission

### Exploitation Result (3)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of encryption  $\rightarrow$  Eavesdropping

▶User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 54022 (54022), Dst Port: 33445 (33445) ▼IEEE C37.118 Synchrophasor Protocol, Command Frame
▶ Synchronization word: 0xaa41 Framesize: 18
PMU/DC ID number: 12 SOC time stamp (UTC): 2015-04-16 19:53:57
► Time quality flags
Fraction of second (raw): 0
▼Command data
0101 = Command: send CFG-2 frame (0x0005)
Checksum: 0x7867 [correct]
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0010 00 2e 92 e9 40 00 40 11 a9 d3 7f 00 00 01 7f 00@.@
0020 00 01 d3 06 82 a5 00 1a fe 2d aa 41 00 12 00 0c

Captured C37.118 Command Frame: request CONFIG-2

## Exploitation Result (4)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of encryption  $\rightarrow$  Eavesdropping

No.	Time	Protocol	Length	Info					
1	0.00000000	SYNCHROPHASOR	60	Command Frame, send	CFG-2 frame				
2	0.00080000	SYNCHROPHASOR	116	Configuration Frame	2				
4	0.000348000	SYNCHROPHASOR	60	Command Frame, data	transmission on				
5	0.037259000	SYNCHROPHASOR	68	Data Frame					
7	0.077290000	SYNCHROPHASOR	68	Data Frame					
	или зупенторна.								
-	ronization word:	0xaa01							
Frames	size: 26								
PMU/DC	ID number: 2								
SOC ti	SOC time stamp (UTC): 2015-05-05 21:16:26								
▶Time o	▶ Time quality flags								
Fracti	ion of second (ra	w): 11408507							
▼Measur	rement data, usin	g frame number 2	2 as configura	tion frame					
▼Stati	▼Station: "Home "								
▶Flag	▶ Flags								
▼Phasors (1)									
Phasor #1: "P1 ", 315.75V/_ 122.77°									
Frequency deviation from nominal: 500mHz (actual frequency: 50.500Hz)									
Rate	e of change of fr	equency: 0.000H	z/s						

Captured C37.118 Data Frame



### Exploitation Result (5)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of user and message authentication → frame spoofing
  - Procedures
    - Capture an authentic frame
    - Duplicate the captured frame but change the bytes that indicate the actual commands, measurements, or configurations to the spoofed values.
    - Change the time stamp of the frame
    - Recalculate the checksum
    - Inject the forged frames

#### Exploitation Result (6)

#### Vulnerability Exploitation

- Lack of user and message authentication
  - Command frame spoofing

	No.	Time	Protocol	Length	I	Info
		0.00000000	SYNCHROPHASOR			ommand Frame, send CFG-2 frame
	2	0.000080000	SYNCHROPHASOR			onfiguration Frame 2
	4	0.000348000	SYNCHROPHASOR		60 C	ommand Frame, data transmission on
	5	0.037259000	SYNCHROPHASOR	(	68 Da	ata Frame
	7	0.077290000	SYNCHROPHASOR		68 Da	ata Frame
	9	0.117290000	SYNCHROPHASOR		68 Da	ata Frame
				:		
	909	18.117393000	SYNCHROPHASOR	f	58 Da	ata Frame
$\rightarrow$		18.137852000	SYNCHROPHASOR	-		ommand Frame, data transmission off

### Exploitation Result (7)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of user and message authentication
    - Command frame spoofing

New command UDP datagram received.

Command Frame for Turn OFF data received from PDC. Data Transmission Started for PDC.

#### Exploitation Result (8)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of user and message authentication
    - Configuration frame spoofing

No.	Time	Protocol	Length	Info	0			
1048	11.633387000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	Frame			
1051	11.666740000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
1054	11.700111000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	Frame			
1057	11.733398000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
1060	11.766735000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
	11.800107000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
1066	11.833366000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
1069	11.866743000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
	11.900110000	SYNCHROPHASOR			a Frame			
1075	11.933426000	SYNCHROPHASOR	72	Data	a Frame			
▼IEEE C37.118 Synchrophasor Protocol, Data Frame								
▶ Synchronization word: 0xaa01								
Framesize: 30								
PMU/DC ID number: 2								
SOC time stamp (UTC): 2015-06-19 18:30:46								
▶ Time quality flags								
Fraction of second (raw): 15099494								
Measurement data, no configuration frame found								
Checksum: 0xeaf9 [correct]								

### Exploitation Result (9)


- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of user and message authentication
    - Data frame spoofing

🛞 🗇 💿 PHASOR_MEASUREMENTS.txt (~/Desktop/iPDC-v1.3.1/DBServer-1.1) - gedit							
🔋 📔 Open 🔹 🖄 Save 🛛 🔮	🛻 Undo 🦽 🔏 🖷 💼 🔍 🛠						
📓 falseDataCommand.py 🗙 📋 PHA	SOR_MEASUREMENTS.txt ×						
2,2,1431041443,700000, P1	,133/10./300/3,0.000030						
2,2,1431641443,800000,"P1	",199773.781250,0.001146						
2,2,1431641443,840000,"P1	",199786.000000,0.001161						
2,2,1431641443,880000,"P1	",199746.281250,0.000932						
2,2,1431641443,920000,"P1	",199731.031250,0.000947						
2,2,1431641443,960000,"P1	",199724.906250,0.000902						
2,2,1431641444,0,"P1	",199776.843750,0.001161						
2,2,1431641444,40000,"P1	",199782.953125,0.001176						
2,2,1431641444,80000,"P1	",199789.046875,0.001176						
2,2,1431641444,120000,"P1	",199770.765625,0.001237						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",199804.343750,0.001298						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,200000,"P1	",199801.265625,0.001207						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,240000,"P1	",199789.046875,0.001191						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1 2,2,1431641444,280000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000 " 100001 206075 0 001202						
2,2,1431641444,280000, P1 2,2,1431641444,160000, "P1	",199801.296875,0.001283 ",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431041444,100000, P1 2,2,1431641444,320000, "P1	",199828.781250,0.001344						
2,2,1431641444,520000, P1 2,2,1431641444,160000, P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,160000, P1 2,2,1431641444,360000, P1	",199767.687500,0.001207						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	".0.000000.0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,100000, P1	",199825.703125,0.001313						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,440000,"P1	",199804.328125,0.001268						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,480000,"P1	",199731.015625,0.000917						
2,2,1431641444,520000,"P1	",199828.781250,0.001344						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
2,2,1431641444,560000,"P1	",199816.531250,0.001268						
2,2,1431641444,160000,"P1	",0.000000,0.000000						
	Plain Text  Tab Width: 8  Ln 248, Col 60 INS						




#### Exploitation Result (10)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Mishandling of unexpected frames
    - To improve the efficiency of fuzzing...



#### Exploitation Result (11)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Fuzz Testing
    - Command frame fuzzing: PMU simulator became unresponsive after receiving fuzzed command frames that indicate the command "Send CONFIG-2" and duplicate "Turn data transmission on" command frames



#### Exploitation Result (12)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Fuzz Testing
    - Command frame fuzzing: PMU simulator became unresponsive after receiving fuzzed frames that indicate the command "Send CONFIG-2" and duplicate "Turn data transmission on" command frames.
    - Configuration frame fuzzing: passed
    - Data frame fuzzing: passed

### Exploitation Result (13)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of input validation (SQL injection)
    - SQL was used to manage the configurations of different registered PMU devices.
       SELECT \* FROM MAIN\_CONFIG\_TABLE WHERE DEVICE ID = PMU\_ID\_Number
    - PMU\_ID\_Number is provided by external input and extracted from the received configuration frame
    - If the PMU\_ID\_Number is specified as "2; DROP TABLE\_MAIN\_CONFIG\_TABLE"
      - The SQL query becomes:

SELECT \* FROM MAIN\_CONFIG\_TABLE WHERE DEVICE ID = 2; DROP TABLE MAIN\_CONFIG\_TABLE



### Exploitation Result (14)

- Vulnerability Exploitation
  - Lack of input validation (SQL injection)
    - Passed SQL injection test
      - Sanitize the input
      - Use parameterized queries with strongly typed parameters

SELECT \* FROM MAIN\_CONFIG\_TABLE WHERE DEVICE ID =
PMU\_ID\_Number


Input validation: ensured to be a 16-bit positive integer

#### **Exploit Development**

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Exploit vulnerabilities command frame spoofing and data frame spoofing
  - A practical attack that hijacks the data transmission stream
  - Can be performed with a Scapy script
  - Attackers taking over ongoing phasor phasor data transmission and sending falsified measurement data to the upstream PDC to mislead the user of the data.
  - Demonstrated with WECC 179-bus system model


#### Exploit Development Scenario

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Scenario




#### Exploit Development Setup

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Testbed set up for demonstration




#### **Exploit Development Steps**

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Attack timeline




### Exploit Development Steps (2)

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Wireshark capture during the attack



#### Exploit Development Result

- Exploit development: Data stream hijacking
  - Impact on situational awareness



#### **Defense and Countermeasures**

- Security recommendations and best practices
  - Use encryption (SSL/TLS, IPsec)
  - Enable mutual authentication (X.509 certificates)
  - Use message authentication code (SSL/TLS, IPsec)
  - End-to-end encryption compatible devices should be preferred
  - Thorough fuzz testing of all network interfaces
  - Follow the guideline to avoid SQL injection attack
  - Deploy an intrusion detection system
  - Use redundant devices and communication infrastructure

### Let's Try Password Cracking with Kali

- Password cracking
  - some crackers claim 30% success rate
- Try with Kali
  - John the Ripper
  - Hashcat
  - and many more...

# Assignment

- Basic hacking exercise: password cracking
- Following the instructions on the remaining slides, show me screenshots of your results and answer questions on the slides.
- In addition, answer this question:

What is password salting? Is it more secure than unsalted password? Why?

## Install Kali

Download VirtualBox or VMware images (I used this)

https://www.offensive-security.com/kali-linux-vmware-arm-imagedownload/

- Username: root
- Password: toor
- Or download from Kali.org

https://www.kali.org/downloads/

# JtR-unsalted password hash

- Go to Applications (upper left corner) -> 05 password attacks -> john
- Check manual
- Create pwd.txt (or any name) on Desktop (or any directory)

# JtR-unsalted password hash

- Insert an entry into pwd.txt root: 24afc8bc80e548d66c4e7ff72171c5
- This is an md5 hash of "toor"
- In the terminal opened, enter Desktop and type:
- john --format=raw-md5 --pot=./list.pot pwd.txt
- Check your list.pot on Desktop
- If stead, you just type this, what do you see?
   john pwd.txt

# JtR-salted password hash

- In the termnal, type unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > mypass.txt
- john mypass.txt
- john --show mypass.txt
- Look for your cracked password
- You can also create your own salted password hash list using a generator like this one:

http://online-code-generator.com/md5-hash-with-optionalsalt.php

## Hashcat-cracking with wordlist

 Download a wordlist (password dictionary) rockyou.txt (or of your choice) on Desktop

http://scrapmaker.com/download/data/wordlists/dictionaries/ro ckyou.txt

- Check manual
- Create ntlm.txt on Desktop and insert an entry C27975D3A5B9E95ACD37EC1B1B7598B8
- This is an ntlm hash of "ashley"
- You can insert more entries (maybe sth. not in rockyou.txt) into ntlm.txt

### Hashcat-cracking with wordlist

- Go to Applications -> 05 password attacks -> hashcat
- Check manual
- Enter Desktop and type
- hashcat -m 1000 ntlm.txt rockyou.txt
- hashcat -m 100 ntlm.txt rockyou.txt
- What do you see after each command?
  - 1000 is md5

- 100 is sha1